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True lies: delusions and
lie-detection technology
BY DANIEL D. LANGLEBEN, M.D.. FRANK M. DATTILIO, PH.D.
AND THOMAS G. GUTHEI, M.D.
Legally relevant lying is an intentional attempt to convince another
of the truth of a proposition the liar believes to be false. Delusion is
an unintentional product of impaired reality testing that occurs in a
range of psychiatric conditions and psychological states, some of
which could be clinically subtle. Since deception, truth and
delusion differ in the intent rather than reality testing criterion.
Deception and delusion are influenced by the degree of congruence
between subjective and objective reality and are probably mutually
exclusive. Thus, a delusion could lead to an objectively false
statement, that could nevertheless be subjectively true and
indistinguishable from truth by its psychophysiological (i.e., the
polygraph) signature. This article presents a relevant case as a
starting point of an examination of the current and future role of
neurophysiological (i.e.. functional brain imaging) measurements
in the detection of deception. The authors incorporate the recent
data on functional brain imaging to the neuroanatomical
mechanisms of true and false recall, behavioral regulation and
deception into a testable model that could redefine deception and
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separate it from delusions on the basis of objective futictional brain
Imaging meastires.
KEY WORDS: Deception, lie, delusion, polygraph, fMRI, psychophysiology,
psychosis, erotomania, defense mechanism, memory.
Case vignette
Dr. B is an experienced board-certified psychiatrist
specializing in psycho- and pharmacotherapy of mood and
anxiety disorders in young adults. Ms. A is her former
patient, a single young woman, whom Dr. B treated since her
late teens. Ms. A suffered from anxiety and depression and
was treated with a combination of Venlafaxine, low-dose
Olanzapine and insight-oriented psychotherapy. Ms. A also
experienced dissociative symptoms, which Dr. B suspected to
have been related to past sexual abuse, which Ms. A never
explicitly endorsed and/or a personality disorder. After
almost seven years of treatment, Ms. A dropped out of
treatment without explanation. Dr. B only followed up with
one letter to the patient, which went unanswered. Two years
later, Ms. A sued Dr. B and her malpractice insurance
company for damages for alleged sexual abuse during her
treatment. She also threatened to file a complaint with the
police and the state medical board if the case was not quickly
settled. The suit alleged that while Ms. A was under the
influence of psychoactive medication prescribed by Dr. B, the
Dr. repeatedly fondled Ms. A's breasts and performed oral sex
on her. Dr. B. vehemently denied the charges. When Dr. B
reviewed Ms. A's treatment notes, she noticed a pattern of
abnormal same-sex attachment to older females that she did
not address in therapy at the time. Unusually, in a jurisdiction
where polygraph evidence is not admissible in a court of law,
both plaintiffs and defendant attorneys requested a polygraph
353
examination of their clients, and both concurred. The results
of the examination were negative in both cases, suggesting
that both the doctor and the patient were "telling the truth."
The suit was settled out of court for an undisclosed amount.
This case highlights a number of issues at the interface of
psychiatry, psychophysiological lie-detection, and the law.
First, transference exhibited by Ms. A in therapy combined
with probable borderline or histrionic personality traits
(dissociation) may have predisposed the patient to a
delusional interpretation of her therapeutic relationship.'
While there are multiple psychiatric restrictions on the
capacity to stand trial, there are none on the capacity to sue
(US Code Title 28, Rule 17). Delusions occur not only in
psychotic patients who are unlikely to have much credibility
in court, but also in patients with mood and personality
disorders and individuals with otherwise intact reality testing
wbo would appear credible in court or during a forensic
evaluation. Thus, the limited need for probable cause and an
unrestricted capacity to sue, make a civil malpractice lawsuit
by a delusional patient a significant risk to a mental health
practitioner.
Second, despite criticism by such authorities as the National
Academy of Sciences and the United States Office of
Technology Assessment, polygraph examination remains the
unofficial gold standard of truth verification and even when
inadmissible as evidence, could indirectly affect the course of
litigation.-' Had the parties in our vignette not submitted to a
polygraph examination, they might not have settled out of court.
Third, the impact of discrepancy between objective and
subjective reality caused by impaired reality testing, on the
biological parameters (polygraph or otherwise) of responding
during any interview seeking objective truth, has not been
well studied. In fact, the confusion between the concept of
subjective and objective reality is not uncommon not only
among clients and patients but also the practitioners and
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researchers. In the case of Ms. A and Dr. B, the plaintiff's
story is likely to be both subjectively true and objectively
false; Ms. A believed that she has been molested by Dr. B
and was thus not lying, however, the odds of such event
having taken place are less than the those of Ms. A having
had a delusion. Remarkably, our case does not serve as
evidence against the polygraph examination, as it may
initially appear: Both parties were telling their SUBJECTIVE
truths and passed the polygraph examination.
Lack of data on the neurophysiology of deception and
delusions, has been a major obstacle on the path to a reliable
and reproducible lie-detection, in particular in individuals
with abnormal reality testing. The goal of the present article
is to re-examine these issues in light of recent advances in
neuroscience research and to propose further direction for the
study of those phenomena of particular relevance to forensic
psychiatry. The proposal is based on a record of brain
activity, which serves as a more solid material foundation
than in previous studies.
Recently, significant progress has been made in three relevant
areas: The functional and anatomical brain correlates of true
and false recall/" the patterns of brain activity in patients
with disorders of reality testing, such as schizophrenia'"' and
the development of alternative methods of lie-detection,
using correlates of central nervous system activity such as
Electroencephalogram (EEG) and functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI)." "
Delusions Delusions are a firmly held "false" belief that is inconsistent
with the cultural beliefs of the subject's group. Even though
implausibility and idiosyncrasy are both indices of a
delusion, it is the incorrigibility —by logic or evidence —with
which a conviction is held that serves as the hallmark of a
delusion. From the viewpoint of lie detection, a firm
conviction makes a statement subjectively true. According to
Jaspers, "experiences that accompany delusions are often
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perceived as being real"'^  " yet, this conviction may be less
stable than previously thought.-" In fact, the degree of
conviction in the veracity of a delusion is inversely related to
the general severity of patients' psychotic state; frequently,
this conviction is the target of pharmacotherapy and a gauge
of treatment progress. '^ In clinical parlance this is referred to
as "insight." Delusions may also serve as unconscious
defenses against the anxiety caused by awareness of one's
psychotic symptoms by rationalizing, organizing or
"explaining" the hallucinations and paranoia, though this
hypothesis has been recently challenged." This internally
beneficial role may account in part for the imperviousness of
delusions to logical reasoning.
Though commonly associated with schizophrenia or acute
mania, delusions are a symptom present in other psychiatric
and neurodegenerative disorders as well. A disorder whose
only manifestation is a delusion of romantic love by another
person (erotomania) has also been described, often in the
setting of a personality disorder: Patients with De
Clerambault (delusion passionelle) syndrome have sued their
doctors for malpractice in situations similar to the
aforementioned case vignette." A related disorder of
pseudologia fantastica (Munchausen's syndrome) involves
"pathological" lying, defined as lying for the "primary" or
"internal", rather than "secondary" gain.'"* The term has also
been misapplied to individuals with personality disorders
lying for a secondary gain, where the pathology is not in the
motive or goal of a deception but in the frequency with which
they resort to it.-' In psychotic disorders, delusions are
indicators of psychotic loss of contact with reality.-'' -* A legal
lie implies intent; thus, affirming one's delusion is not a lie,
since subjectively it is a truth. In the legal setting, delusions
pose a particular challenge for deception detection devices
because they are expected to identify a deviation from
objective truth with a device sensitive only to the correlates
of subjects' internal (subjective) state. In the case of a
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delusional plaintiff or defendant this may be problematic, as
in our vignette.
Deception in contrast to delusion, deception has traditionally been
defined as a conscious event or process. The basic
components of a legally-relevant deception are intent,
presence of a target and a conscious awareness of a reality
incongruous with the one the liar is attempting to impart to
the target.-' '" Remarkably and somewhat counter-intuitively,
the external (objective) veracity of an internal belief is
irrelevant.^' Moreover, fabrication of a false story to replace
the subjectively true one, while common, is not necessary:
"Denying what is or confirming what is not" is sufficient to
meet criteria for deception." In the case of delusions, the
internal belief is incongruous with external reality; however,
the intent and awareness are absent. In summary, for the
purpose of this article, lying or deception are defined as "a
deliberate attempt to convince another of the truth of a
proposition the liar believes to be false."
The Despite controversial validity, inadmissibility as legal
polygraph evidence and the ban on its use in non-government pre-
employment screening, polygraph and its variants remain the
only common psychophysiological methods of lie detection.
Though frequently equated with the multichannel
physiological recording (MPR) system it relies on, the
polygraph is, strictly speaking, a combination of the MPR
with a particular method of questioning, known as the
Control Question Test (CQT). The CQT, in neuroscience
terms, is an example of a "symptom provocation paradigm,"
namely, a structured task designed to provoke the symptom of
interest at predetermined time(s). The structure of such
deception "model" or "paradigm" usually reflects assumptions
of the model designer, which may not always be obvious to
or shared with the later users of the model or its results. For
example, one of the assumptions in the CQT is that everyone
has stolen something sometime in the past and that when
asked to respond in the negative to a question: "Have you
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ever stolen anything," subjects will produce a neuro-
physiological response typical for a lie. This response is
termed "presumed lie" and used for comparison with
responses to questions, the true answers to which are
unknown. An alternative deception paradigm is called the
Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). "Guilty" refers to prior
knowledge, rather than the presence or absence of guilt. This
paradigm is based on the assumption that, an enhanced
psychophysiological response to a question about a specific
detail of a particular crime (e.g., color of a stolen car)
indicates possession of "Guilty Knowledge" and thus
involvement in the crime in question." Strictly speaking, a
GKT combined with MPR is not a "polygraph." Though the
debate about the advantages of each of the paradigms (CQT
vs. GKT) for lie-detection has raged for decades, in
neuropsychological terms both are "forced choice"
paradigms.^^-" Both carry a number of flaws and potential
confounds and are probably below the standards of paradigm
design in modern experimental neuroscience. Yet, these
deficiencies of the traditional lie-detection paradigms are not
the "fatal flaw" that justifies the search for alternatives. The
stronger argument against the polygraph and its variants lies
in the MPR technology itself, commonly and inaccurately
referred to as the "polygraph," regardless of the deception
paradigm (GKT, CQT, or others) used with it. MPR measures
blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory expansion of the chest,
and galvanic skin response (GSR) or skin conductance
response (SCR). All of these are mediated by the peripheral
nervous system and are correlates of anxiety or arousal. Since
deception is a cognitive phenomenon that takes place in the
brain, the potential of the MPR in a lie—detection system is
theoretically inferior to the more proximal, central nervous
system (CNS) correlates of brain activity that could be
obtained by EEG and fMRI.'" Remarkably, one group likely
to be overrepresented in the polygraphers' offices are
individuals with antisocial personality disorder, that may be
associated with an abnormally low MPR response to stress.""*"
Furthermore, research on the limitations of the accuracy of
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the polygraph in otber special populat ions, such as
psychiatric patients, is surprisingly limited, considering its
widespread use and despite clear evidence of an abnormal
autonomic system in schizophrenia and other psychiatric
disorders.^' Thus, the expectation that since brain imaging
measures are more accurate than tbe polygraph because they
are correlates of the central rather than peripheral nervous
activity, remains to be confirmed experimentally, in tbe
laboratory and then in controlled clinical trials in relevant
populations.
Brain imaging Evoked related potentials (ERP) and brain blood flow bave
also been used in tbe study of deception.^-^'' Cri t ical
components of a brain-behavior correlation study include a
symptom provocation paradigm, closely following tbe
definition of the behavior in quest ion, as well as a
measurement tecbnique, such as skin conductance, electrical
brain activity or a functional map of cerebral metabolism or
blood flow.
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is one of the most
widely used noninvasive methods of medical imaging. MRI is
based on signals emitted by atoms that have been perturbed
by strong magnetic fields. Briefly, the imaging contrast in
MRI is derived from radiofrequency signals emitted by the
hydrogen atoms in the tissue, placed in the strong (main)
magnetic field and intermittently perturbed by other, smaller
magnetic fields (gradients) applied at an angle to tbe main
field. An MRI scanner is a large superconducting magnet
with a central bore, to accommodate the patient, equipped
with additional electromagnetic coils capable of producing a
smaller rapidly shifting gradient field. MRI scanners are
usually described by the strength of the larger "main"
magnetic field, expressed in Tesia (T). One Tesla is x 10,000
the force of gravity. The field strength of modern clinical
MRI scanners is between 0.35 and 3T. Functional MRI is a
variant of MRI imaging fast enougb to allow correlation witb
a behavior of interest, usually on the time scale of seconds.
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Field strength above IT and advanced gradient coils are
required for functional MRI. The specific way in which
hydrogen molecules are perturbed by the gradient fields,
determines which tissue type or physiological process is
highlighted. One fMRI technique, aimed at maximizing the
signal produced by oxygenated hemoglobin and minimizing
the time necessary to obtain an image has been dubbed Blood
Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) fMRI.'' BOLD fMRI
can be used to track the changes in blood flow that
correspond to changes in local brain activity and is the
premiere tool of research focusing on the brain activity
correlates of particular behavior. BOLD fMRI is the imaging
technique used in most neuropsychological studies, so that an
fMRI study could be assumed to be BOLD fMRI, unless
stated otherwise. Similarly to the polygraph, which consists
of an MPR and a paradigm designed to elicit a behavior of
interest (deception), fMRI experiment consists of the
recording device (MRI scanner) and a symptom provocation
paradigm. Because of the small effect size of the fMRI
response during cognitive activity, multiple observations of
each target behavior ("conditions," e.g., "lie" and "truth") are
needed for subsequent correlation between a condition and
the BOLD fMRI signal it may have produced. Similarly to
the polygraph, the magnitude of BOLD fMRI signal is only
meaningful in relation to a baseline that needs to be
established for each "condition" of interest.^ * Thus, the choice
of a valid baseline condition in a behavioral fMRI experiment
is as critical as the determination of baseline signal in
response to a "probable truth" or a "probable lie" in a
polygraph examination.
For example, comparing a brain response to a relevant
question about a crime with response to a blank screen would
always yield significant differences, which would be
meaningless because blank screen is not a valid comparison to
a question about a crime, even if the suspect has not been
involved in it. In our vignette, Ms. A's delusion was
improbable enough to be deemed a "probable lie." The
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polygraph then produced a probable false negative result with
a "probable lie." Remarkably, had the polygraph been reliable,
such a result could be used to diagnose a delusional state.
Though the number of variables needed to describe a specific
deception variant is seemingly endless, a few emerge as key
variables defining a type of deception: Those include
endorsement of deception by the investigator, presence of a
target for deception, assumption of secrecy of the deception
by the deceiver and the intent.^" Though these parameters are
consistent with the consensus definitions of deception (see
above), laboratory deception experiments differ in their
ecological validity, e.g., degree to which they approximate the
"real-life". Since 2001, studies using BOLD fMRI, employed
a variety of deception paradigms of increasing ecological
validity. Despite the paradigm variability, the findings overlap
significantly. The key conclusion from the initial studies was
that the cognitive differences between deception and truth
have neurophysiological correlates detectable by fMRI.^"
Subsequent series of studies confirmed the involvement of the
medial anterior prefrontal cortex and the bilateral inferior
lateral and superior parietal gyri in deception. These studies
demonstrated that the effect previously observed at a group
level, could be detected in single subjects and even single
events of ly ing ."" Moreover, the fact that the activation
related to truth-telling tends to locate posterior to the activity
during lie,"" supports the prediction,"'" that deception is a
more complex and working memory-intensive task than
truth." The implication of these observations is that a response
could be classified as lie by the pattern of brain activity it
produced, regardless of whether it is objectively true or false.
Essentially, a response would be classified as lie or truth based
solely on responders' (internal) point of reference, objectively
demonstrated by fMRI or other CNS measure.
Several critical aspects of neurobiology of deception have not
yet received sufficient attention. First is the effect of
countermeasures on the accuracy of lie-truth discrimination.''''
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Subjective
reality,
memory
retrieval and
delusions
A wide variety of countermeasures could be used to sabotage
lie-detection, including pharmacological interventions that
are outside of the scope of this article. Ganis et al., was the
first to explore the effect of rehearsal on the fMRI pattern
produced by a lie.**' Rehearsal and practice are of particular
clinical importance, since they are used by both attorneys and
therapists to modify their clients' behavior and sometimes,
memories."''^ Data on the CNS effects of cognitive
countermeasures on the central nervous system correlates of
deception suggests that countermeasures are likely to
attenuate, but not prevent, lie-truth discrimination.''^" Second,
none of the brain imaging studies of deception parametrically
manipulated the risk/reward ratio of deception, which could
be much higher in real life situations than in standard
laboratory experiments. Expanding the findings from healthy
controls to a range of special populations would also require
additional experimental support.
Finally, a legally important aspect, that has received little
attention from neuroscientists studying deception, is the
concept of deception as a social or "theory of mind"
behavior. Theory of mind, also called meta-cognition, has
been defined as "thinking about thinking" or "thinking about
what someone else is thinking."''* Monitoring one's social
interactions for potential deception is a private case of
individual's "theory of mind."''" The jury interaction with
plaintiffs, defendants and their attorneys is also an example
of multiple "theory of mind" processes. Brain imaging
studies, with participants trying to detect deception rather
than to deceive, indicate that theory of mind may have
characteristic patterns of brain activity.™
Memory is not static: Strong preclinical evidence indicates
that it is reconsolidated after each retrieval, leaving it open to
modification by rehearsal, type of query or pharmacological
agents that could interfere with reconsolidation. '^ " Moreover,
preliminary clinical evidence indicates that memory retrieval
and reconsolidation could be affected by collateral
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unconscious mechanisms, particularly when there is an
emotional correlate or tag to a particular memory component.""
While the act of deception requires conscious awareness and
intent, the process of recall and reconsolidation of a memory
could be entirely unconscious." Together, the brain imaging
data on recall and deception support the following
hypothetical neural cascade of deception. There are two
parts: The "reality testing" segment and the "behavioral
control" segment. The first is a partially unconscious process
of data retrieval and coherent narrative formation,'" " which
then passes into awareness. The second is a conscious
decision to "release," "suppress," or "suppress ->• replace the
narrative -* release." Thus, intentional deception can only
take place during this relatively brief, conscious stage of
what is essentially a general utterance generation process.
This model allows a prediction of the temporal and spatial
pattern of brain activity during the process of deception;
during the "reality testing" segment, the pattern of brain
activity will be that of recall and narrative formation,*" "'
while the behavioral control stage would be similar to other
situations requiring regulation of behavior.*-*"'
Recall can be modulated by unconscious input from multiple
Brain Areas related to individuals' prior learned experiences
as well as the unconditional response patterns.*' Anatomically,
the extended limbic system is likely to be involved in this
process.*'' This model is congruent not only with the recent
reports on suppression of unwanted memories and true and
false recall, but also with the classical dynamic theories of
conscious and unconscious and the unconscious defense
mechanisms.*'"' Within this model, a delusion would be
indistinguishable from truth with either psychophysiological
or brain-based lie-detector system, but could have a different
brain signature during the "reality testing" stage of deception.
Recent data indicate that while both true and false recall
involve semantic trace retrieval, only true recall involves
sensory trace retrieval.™"'
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Conclusion
Theoretically, delusions and other impairments in reality
testing that are indistinguishable from tbe trutb on tbe
cognitive level could be inaccessible to either the polygraph
or brain-imaging based lie-detection. Experimental data from
well-controlled experiments on psychophysiological lie-
detection in delusional subjects are required to confirm or
refute tbis assumption. We bypotbesize tbat in delusional
patients, brain activity patterns range from tbose typical of
deception (medial and lateral anterior frontal cortex) to those
characteristic of truth (posterior parietal). Such data could
lead to new, functional definition of a delusion as an
objectively false belief that has a brain signature of truth and
produce a novel method of neurophysiological monitoring of
the development of "insight" both in psychotic and nonpsychotic
patients. Successful treatment would be associated witb a
change in the brain patterns associated witb a delusion or a
pathological defense from "truth" to "lie." Another broader
implication of the proposed experiments would be an estimate
of the reliability of psychophysiological investigations in non-
psychotic subjects with firmly-held beliefs.
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